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Abstract
This study examines the eﬀect of corporate ownership on information asymmetry as 
measured by bid-ask spread in the emerging markets of China. Government ownership 
has significant and positive impacts on bid-ask spread during the period 1995-2000, 
but disappears afterward during 2001-2003. The finding that state ownership raised 
bid-ask spread in the early period is consistent with recent studies on emerging markets 
including China, which indicate that ﬁrms with higher state ownership tend to have a 
greater deviation between cash ﬂow rights and control rights (eg, Wei et al., 2005). This 
implies that lower state ownership is associated with lower information asymmetry in 
the market, an economic consequence of signiﬁcant economic reform and privatization 
regarding the market microstructure. However, with more active control transfers and 
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emergence of private controlling shareholders, regulatory changes in ownership structure 
and corporate governance mechanisms, and thus an improved legal and institutional 
environment, the link between the government ownership and information asymmetry 
turns to be insigniﬁcant in the later period. These results have important implications 
for transparency and information disclosure policies as well as privatization in emerging 
markets.
JEL classiﬁcation: G14; G15; G32; M41
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1. Introduction
Information asymmetry underscores several key concepts in ﬁnance and accounting. 
In corporate finance, information asymmetry is commonly assumed to describe the 
relationship between corporate insiders and outside investors in the market (eg, Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997). In financial accounting, information asymmetry is related to 
transparency. For example, various authors such as Verrecchia (2001) and Bushman et 
al. (2004) show that voluntary corporate disclosure reduces information asymmetry and 
improves general transparency, and thereby potentially enhances corporate valuation 
although it may also entail risk of disclosing useful information to competitors. And in 
market microstructure, information asymmetry faced by market makers may increase 
bid-ask spread because of the cost of adverse selection (eg, Stoll, 2003).1 
We argue that one source of information asymmetry is corporate ownership structure 
in line with some studies that have related bid-ask spread to corporate insider and block 
ownership. Because the market may perceive insiders to have superior access to a ﬁrm’s 
private information, bid-ask spread may rise for all, suggesting a positive relationship 
between insider ownership and bid-ask spread (Chiang and Venkatesh, 1988). With 
1 Information asymmetry models of bid-ask spreads such as Glosten and Milgrom (1985), and Easley and 
O’Hara (1987) envision a market consisting of informed traders, uninformed liquidity traders, and market 
makers [For more traditional models of bid-ask spreads, see Demsetz (1968) and Amihud and Mendelson 
(1986)]. Informed traders trade on private information not currently reflected in price, while uninformed 
liquidity traders trade based on public information or on their assessment of market fundamentals. Faced with 
the possibility of potential informed trading, market makers – who are not privy to private information – set 
a higher bid-ask spread for all market participants because of their inability to distinguish between trades that 
are information motivated or liquidity motivated. In eﬀect, part of the cost of adverse selection stemming from 
facing informed trading is passed on to liquidity-based noise traders. A prediction of these models is that the 
bid-ask spread is an increasing function of information asymmetry. In addition, Brockman and Chung (2000) 
show that bid-ask spreads increase with information asymmetry regardless of whether trading is settled by 
market makers or dealers, and whether the market is quote-driven or order-driven.
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regard to the eﬀect of a controlling shareholder on agency costs of the ﬁrm, there are 
two competing eﬀects (Morck et al., 1988). On the one hand, a controlling shareholder 
is more likely to monitor management actions, limit the extent of agency costs through 
incentive alignment between managers and outside investors, and reduce information 
asymmetry (Hope et al., 2009). On the other hand, a controlling shareholder can take 
advantage of controlling position, direct private beneﬁts for personal consumption (which 
is the typical expropriation of minority shareholders and potentially creditors), and 
exacerbate information problems by increasing information asymmetry (eg, Barclay and 
Holderness, 1991; Heﬂin and Shaw, 2000).2 
In this paper, we focus on the eﬀects of state ownership on information asymmetry 
measured by bid-ask spread in China. As Verrecchia (2001) suggests, given their 
generally low information environments, emerging markets provide a unique setting to 
investigate the impacts of institutional characteristics on changes related to information. 
This is because the information content of major corporate strategies, such as ownership 
structure, are likely to be more pronounced in emerging markets than in rich 
information settings such as the US, where the marginal eﬀect of information embedded 
in corporate strategies is not likely to be so strong. 
Moreover, in China, the government has significant ownership holdings even 
for those “privatized” firms traded in the open market.3 Despite the fact that the 
government exists to improve public welfare, the informational consequences of 
particular government policies such as privatization or changes in state ownership are 
not clear. On the one hand, it is plausible that government regulations and reforms 
work for the beneﬁt of improved general transparency for all. On the other hand, the 
government exercise of its control and ownership is also often selective, beset with 
bureaucratic rigidity, and/or favoring personal connections and political affiliations. 
Because of the political nature of the privatization programs (Wei et al., 2005), IPO 
(initial public oﬀering) shares of Chinese state enterprises can be allocated to enhance 
the personal career beneﬁts of CEOs (Chen et al., 2009a). To the extent that net eﬀects 
of government policies are more selective than general, it is likely that the government 
ownership increases information asymmetry and hence increases bid-ask spread.
However, the changes in institutional environment could affect the link between 
the government corporate ownership and information asymmetry. There are a few 
major features of the recent institutional changes in the emerging markets of China 
which may result in such eﬀects. First, starting in 2001, control transfers have become 
more active and private shareholders became controlling shareholders of some listed 
2 In their study of US ﬁrms for 1985, Kini and Mian (1995), however, report results that do not support the 
predictions of asymmetric information models: bid-ask spread has a statistically insignificant relation with 
insider ownership or block ownership.
3 Chen et al. (2009a) report that of the 1,213 state ﬁrms that had been privatized by IPOs from December 2000 
to June 2006, the median state ownership is 33.9%.
JONGMOO JAY CHOI, HEIBATOLLAH SAMI AND HAIYAN ZHOU16
companies (Wang, 2010).4 Second, subsequent to a series of accounting scandals, such 
as Zheng Bai Wen (2000) and Yin Guang Xia (2001), and enhanced regulations on 
fraudulent ﬁnancial statements and market manipulations, litigations against corporate 
management and auditors have become more signiﬁcant (Chen et al., 2010). Third, the 
corporate governance structures of listed companies have been signiﬁcantly improved 
after 2001 due to statutory regulations and guidelines (Wang, 2010). These changes 
in the institutional environment could help improve the disclosure transparency and 
aﬀect the role of government ownership in the information environment. This suggests 
that it is important to control for these changes to study the link between government 
ownership and information asymmetry.
We believe that this study is the ﬁrst of its kind to examine the eﬀect of corporate 
ownership structure on the bid-ask spread in emerging markets.5 Our study also adopts a 
new perspective as it relates to the eﬀects of government on bid-ask spread. Incorporating 
the recent institutional changes of the emerging markets, we conduct our empirical 
analyses separately for the two periods, pre-period versus post-period of institutional 
reform (the period of 1995-2000 versus the period of 2001-2003), using both single-
equation and simultaneous estimation methods. We ﬁnd that bid-ask spreads increased 
with state ownership before the institutional reforms. These results are consistent with 
a market perception that state owners, on balance, may have worked to exploit their 
speciﬁc information advantages more than to enhance general market-wide transparency6 
in an emerging market when institutional facilities are not in place. However, when we 
analyze a sample for the post institutional reform period of 2001-2003, the eﬀect of state 
ownership on information asymmetry disappears. Such results are indications that the 
reduction in the magnitude of state ownership, regulatory changes regarding ownership 
and corporate governance, and changes in legal and institutional environment help to 
reduce information asymmetry compared to previous periods.
The implications of these results go beyond the speciﬁcs of this paper. First, this study 
provides the ﬁrst direct evidence on the impacts of ownership structure on information 
asymmetry as measured by bid-ask spread in emerging markets, thus linking corporate 
governance and market microstructure literatures. Second, unless proper safeguards are 
in place, we show that, from a market perspective, state investors may have an incentive 
to exploit their specific information asymmetry for their own interest rather than 
4 One important feature is the transfers of state shares from government agents to market-oriented state-
owned enterprises. According to Wang (2010), the percentage of shares of listed companies that were held by 
government agents declined from above 20% in 1994 to below 10% in 2004.
5 Several studies on Chinese capital markets, such as Sun and Tong (2003) and Wei et al. (2005), examine the 
eﬀect of privatization and ownership changes on ﬁrm valuation. Cull and Xu (2005) show that property rights 
and private ownership inﬂuence proﬁt reinvestment by the Chinese ﬁrms. 
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enhancing general informational transparency.6 These have signiﬁcant implications for 
accounting standard setters and regulators, as well as for an insight into the potential 
economic consequences of privatization.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview 
of institutional background and develops hypotheses. Section 3 discusses research 
methodology, and Section 4 presents data and descriptive statistics. Section 5 discusses 
basic empirical results, and Section 6 explores further empirical issues. Section 7 
concludes the paper.
2. Institutional Background and Hypotheses 
2.1. Ownership Structure in China
The establishment of two national exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen in the early 
1990s helped to privatize state-owned enterprises (SOE) in China. The number of 
publicly listed companies increased markedly from 14 in 1991 to 1,360 in December 
2003. The market value of these two Chinese stock exchanges exceeded that of the Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange in May 2001 (China Daily Press, June 2, 2001), which made 
China the second largest stock market in Asia after Japan.7 Compared to privatization 
in other countries where proceeds of share sales go to the government (Boubakri and 
Cosset, 1998; D’Souza and Megginson, 1999), the Chinese privatization programs tend 
to leave the funds at the discretion of the SOE, and the decision process appears to be 
more politically oriented (Wei et al., 2005).
In addition to shares for domestic investors (called A-shares), Chinese companies 
can issue shares to foreign investors (called B-shares) through the two national stock 
exchanges. Both types of shares are listed on both exchanges. The Chinese companies 
can also cross-list on other foreign stock exchanges, such as H-shares on the Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange and other shares traded in the US, UK, and Singapore. A-shares 
for domestic investors include ﬁve types: state, legal person, employee, individual, and 
management shares. Employee and management shares are those held by managers, 
directors and employees of listed companies. According to Chen et al. (2009b) and 
Wang (2010), management, foreign, and employee shares represent less than 2% of the 
6 The sentiment here is similar to that of Claessens et al. (2002) who suggest, in a diﬀerent context, that the 
deviation between control and ownership can lead to the entrenchment effect of large shareholders. Attig 
et al. (2006) ﬁnd that stocks with greater deviations between ultimate control and ownership have a larger 
information asymmetry component of their bid-ask spread for a sample of Canadian ﬁrms.
7 Over the past several years, there have been significant developments in the stock markets in China. For 
instance, the number of publicly listed firms increased to 1,775 in February 2010 (www.crsc.gov.cn). In 
addition, during January 4 to 24, 2008, China surpassed Japan in stock-market capitalization for the ﬁrst time. 
Again, on July 16, 2009, China overtook Japan as the world’s second largest stock market by value (for more 
details see www.bloomburg.com).
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outstanding shares, thus they cannot act as major voting block shareholders.8
The majority of shares are held by the government (“state shares”) and corporations 
or economic entities (“legal person shares”). State shares are those controlled by the 
Ministry of Finance through the State Assets Management Bureau (SAMB) and its local 
agencies, although some are also owned by state owned enterprises (SOEs) controlled by 
central government (SOECG) and local government (SOELG) (Chen et al., 2009b).9 
Legal person shares are shares held by Chinese domestic legal entities, including 
corporations, financial institutions, and majority state-controlled enterprises. Legal-
persons could also be other entities such as collectively owned enterprises, township and 
village enterprises, or other listed companies (Wang, 2010). To enhance the performance 
of listed companies, starting in 2001, the government has encouraged more active 
control transfers from government agents to SOEs (Chen et al., 2009b; Wang, 2010).
Despite privatization, the inﬂuence of government is pervasive. Beyond exercising its 
proportional shareholder rights, the government exercises controls through regulations 
and political directives, or through the appointment of management and members of the 
board of directors. The Chinese government generally endorses individuals considered 
for management and board membership. The regulation concerning IPOs includes a 
mandate that at least 25% of total outstanding shares should be issued to individual 
shareholders. Nevertheless, because of the dominance of state and institutional shares, 
individual investors typically are minority shareholders. 
2.2. Changes in Institutional Environment and Hypothesis Development
State Ownership
Recent studies on emerging markets including China have focused on the impact 
of state ownership on ﬁrm performance (eg, Sun and Tong, 2007; Sami et al., 2009). 
Insiders such as former government oﬃcials may gain control of the ﬁrm either through 
8 The changes in regulations on share transfers over the last several years have dramatically changed the share 
structures in China. For instance, the foreign acquisition of state-owned and legal shares in listed companies, 
which had been prohibited since 1995, has been permitted subsequent to the Notice on the Relevant Issues 
Regarding the Transfer of State-owned Shares and Legal shares of Listed Companies to Foreign Investors (2003). 
In addition, A-share market was opened to foreign investors pursuant to the Interim Provisions on the 
Administration of Security and Investment in China by Qualiﬁed Foreign Institutional Investors (2002), which was 
later replaced by the Provisions on the Administration of Security and Investment in China by Qualiﬁed Foreign 
Institutional Investors (2006). Thus the discussions on different share categories, which are relevant to our 
sample period, might not be applicable for the years after the reform.
9 In reality, government agents and market-oriented SOEs are the two types of entities exercising the control 
rights of state shares. Government agents became state shareholders when their sole-owned enterprise was 
restructured into a listed company, or when they invested their controlled state-owned assets in a listed 
company. These government agents could be: (1) central government ministries and commissions, (2) national 
industrial companies, (3) local government bureaus, (4) local branches of SAMB, and (5) local state assets 
operating companies. For detailed explanations, see Wang (2010) and Chen et al. (2009b).
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direct government appointments or indirect political inﬂuence, despite owning few or 
no cash ﬂow rights. Similarly, the actual government control of a partially privatized 
ﬁrm may be greater than what its ownership proportion may indicate – the government 
can inﬂuence the ﬁrm through policy directives and political inﬂuences, as well as the 
appointment of top management and board members (Sami et al., 2009). Companies 
with high level of state ownership also lack an effective personnel management 
system that establishes a clear link between performance and promotion. Because 
state ownership has a negative impact on ﬁrm performance, it is likely that high state 
ownership is associated with a high level of adverse selection by managers (Sun and 
Tong, 2003; Sami et al., 2009). 
The level of state ownership should be positively associated with the level of 
information asymmetry, given that state ownership is positively associated with adverse 
selection by managers or that it creates a deviation between control and ownership. 
The deviation between control and ownership by the government may compromise 
general transparency and create information asymmetry. That is, ﬁrms with higher state 
ownership might have less incentive to commit to full corporate disclosure, especially 
when informed shareholders expropriate other shareholders’ interests. This would 
result in a larger information asymmetry component of the bid-ask spread (Attig et al., 
2006).10 
Alternatively, it is also possible that, as a promoter for the maximization of public 
welfare, the government seeks to enhance general transparency of corporate disclosure 
for all information users. With the status of a controlling shareholder, it could be easier 
and more efficient for the government to directly monitor management actions and 
thus actually reduce agency costs (Hope et al., 2009). Furthermore, the controlling 
state shareholders could enable a long investment horizon, which helps build strong 
relationships between the firms and external shareholders and creditors (Ellul et al., 
2007). In this case, while the overall information environment of the market may 
improve, the information transparency would increase and thus relative information 
asymmetry would decline. If this is true, a higher state ownership may arguably be 
associated with a lower level of information asymmetry. 
To summarize, state ownership could derive two forces that work in opposite 
directions. Political influence, increased agency costs and information problems 
associated with high state ownership work to increase information asymmetry. 
However, public-welfare maximization, incentive alignment, investment horizon eﬀects, 
and greater monitoring associated with high state ownership will work to increase 
information transparency and decrease information asymmetry. More pertinent to our 
study on the emerging markets, we are primarily interested in the association between 
10 An additional reason, which operates in the same direction, is a possibility that high state ownership implies 
less liquidity, which may result in higher bid-ask spread. It is not possible to sort this liquidity eﬀect out from 
that of information asymmetry by estimating a reduced-form equation of bid-ask spread. 
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state ownership and information asymmetry. When state ownership is high, political 
inﬂuence and ineﬀective management monitoring can play a greater role in increasing 
costs associated with agency and information problems. 
However, the recent institutional changes could aﬀect the link between government 
ownership and information asymmetry. One of the important features of these changes 
is related to the recent regulations on the ownership issues of public companies in China. 
First, an announcement was made by China’s State Council on the sale of state-owned 
shares in June 2001, which would change the nature of state shares and make it diﬀerent 
from the practice in earlier years when state-shares were not allowed to be traded in 
public. Also, in recent years, more private enterprises developed into larger corporations 
and went public. These privately controlled firms increased dramatically and could 
have signiﬁcantly changed the market microstructure. According to Sami et al. (2009), 
privately controlled ﬁrms increased signiﬁcantly, from 120 (11% of listed ﬁrms) in 2001 
to 531 (35% of listed ﬁrms) in 2007. In addition, commencing from 2001, domestic 
shareholders with foreign currency accounts have been allowed to purchase B-shares 
which had been sold only to foreign individual investors. This has not only provided 
more investment opportunities for individual shareholders and increased the public ﬂoat 
but also complicated the foreign ownership issues.
Another important feature of the changing institutional environment is the enhanced 
regulations on fraudulent financial statements, market manipulations and increased 
legal litigation risks. Subsequent to a series of accounting scandals, litigation risks 
against corporate management and auditors and the number of public enforcement 
actions taken by regulatory agencies become more signiﬁcant (Chen et al., 2010). For 
instance, the number of enforcement actions taken by the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) and the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges reached a peak 
of 71 cases in 2001, compared to 16 in 2000 (Pistor and Xu, 2005). In addition, in 
January 2002, the Supreme Court issued a corrective notice on accepting civil lawsuits 
against corporate management and their auditors involved in fraudulent statements, 
and permitted intermediate courts to accept such cases. According to China Economic 
Times (2002) quoted by Chen et al. (2010), 893 civil cases against listed companies and/
or their auditors were accepted by the courts in 2002, as compared to about 400 cases 
in 1998 (CPA Newsletter 1998, quoted by Gul et al., 2009). The Supreme Court further 
promulgated the litigation rules in January 2003. It extended the conditions for the 
acceptance of securities litigation from CSRC sanctions to other administrative actions 
or criminal court rulings and placed the burden of proof on auditors in private securities 
litigation.11
11 For detailed discussions on the scandals and relevant lawsuits, see Chen et al. (2010).
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Third, the corporate governance structure has been significantly improved after 
2001. Recognizing the importance of corporate governance, the CSRC has issued a 
series of guidelines to improve corporate governance mechanisms of public companies. 
For instance, in conjunction with the State Economic and Trade Commission, the 
CSRC issued the Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in 2001, which 
provided the basic rules of conduct for top management of listed companies. It also 
introduced the concept of independent directors and discouraged the dual positions 
of chairperson of the board and CEO. Further, the CSRC issued the Guidelines for 
Introducing Independent Directors to the Board of Directors of Listed Companies 
(2001), stipulating that at least one-third of the board should be independent by June 
2003. These regulations have dramatically reformed the board structures of listed 
companies. According to Wang (2010), the percentage of ﬁrms with dual positions of 
Board Chair and CEO declined from 28.35% in 1999 to 23.47% in 2000 and dropped 
further to 20.32% in 2004. In addition, the percentage of firms with at least one 
independent director increased from 3.77% in 1999 to 8.49% in 2000 and 28.52% in 
2001. The number increased to 97.65% in 2002, and 99.05% in 2003 (Wang, 2010).
These significant changes in the institutional environment could affect the 
relationship between state shareholders and information asymmetry. In particular, the 
changes in institutional features could deter political inﬂuence, and stem rising agency 
costs and information problems associated with high state ownership that influence 
increased information asymmetry. Therefore, we separately analyze the relationship 
between state ownership and information asymmetry for the periods before and after the 
institutional reforms in the emerging market settings. 
Based on the above discussions, our hypothesis on the link between state ownership 
and the level of information asymmetry is stated in the following alternative format:
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relation between state ownership and bid-ask spread.
Other Types of Ownership 
Other ownership types could also inﬂuence information asymmetry. For example, a 
usual expectation concerning foreign corporate ownership is that foreign investors are at 
an informational disadvantage about a local ﬁrm compared with domestic investors. This 
is borne out by Choe et al. (2005), who show that domestic investors appear to have an 
informational edge in Korea.12 If so, an increase in foreign ownership may lead to an 
increased demand and pressure for increased disclosure by local ﬁrms. Sami and Zhou 
(2004) ﬁnd that the value relevance of accounting information in the B-share market of 
12 In the same line of argument, Jiang and Kim (2004) use an ex ante point of view and argue that the cost of 
being less informed is lower when foreign investors invest in a ﬁrm with low information asymmetry. Thus 
ceteris paribus, foreign investors are more likely to be attracted to ﬁrms with lower information asymmetry. 
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China (where foreigners invest) is generally higher than in the A-share market (where 
domestic investors trade). The A-shares’ accounting information is prepared and audited 
for domestic investors under the domestic accounting standards, while the B-share 
information is prepared and audited for foreign investors under international accounting 
standards. Firms with foreign investors usually hire Big-Four CPA ﬁrms to help audit 
their ﬁnancial statements. These features suggest that the presence of foreign ownership 
may help to improve the general information environment of public companies.13 The 
increased information transparency, as indicated in better accounting standards and 
higher quality of auditors, can improve the market liquidity (Lang et al., 2009). One 
of the economic consequences of information transparency, or increased disclosure as 
deﬁned in Verrecchia (2001), should include a reduced level of information asymmetry 
in the market. 
However, the literature also indicates that there is an incentive for foreign investors 
to maintain their superior information (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2000). Foreign 
(institutional) investors may have a relatively better capability to process public 
information into private value-relevant information than domestic individual investors. 
As the value of private information increases with information asymmetry, foreign 
investors might be associated with ﬁrms with high information asymmetry.
In the US, existing work on insider trading (Seyhun, 1992; Bris, 2000) provides 
evidence on the profitability of insider trading. Since insider holdings are perceived 
to have a potential for information asymmetry and adverse selection, there should 
be a positive relation between insider ownership and bid-ask spread (eg, Chiang and 
Venkatesh, 1988; Chung and Charoenwong, 1998). Using the IPO data for Chinese 
companies during 1994-1999, Su (2004) finds that given information asymmetry, 
insiders including managers, board members and private owners may retain a larger 
portion of shares to signal their confidence about the firm’s prospects. On the other 
hand, corporate managers are usually selected from the rank of government bureaucrats 
and the extent of managerial ownership in China is limited. This may moderate the 
inﬂuence of insider ownership. Studies suggest a positive relationship between inside 
ownership and bid-ask spread. 
O’Brien and Bhushan (1990) and others argue that firms with high institutional 
holdings have a high level of analyst coverage, which leads to information dissemination 
and lower information asymmetry. However, the eﬀect of institutional ownership also 
depends on the nature of institutions (Lakonishok et al., 1992). Fehle (2004) shows 
that while the eﬀect of institutional ownership on bid-ask spread is generally negative in 
the US (eg, Van Ness et al., 2001), it is positive for certain types of institutions such as 
banks and investment management companies. Moreover, because the analysts’ industry 
13 In addition, foreign investors are shown to contribute to ﬁrm performance through shareholder activism and 
board representation (Choi et al., 2007), by the use of more sophisticated valuation method (Wei et al., 2005), 
and during the privatization process of state-owned enterprises (Xu et al., 2005). 
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and capability are not well developed in emerging markets, their role in information 
dissemination in China may be limited. Given the less-developed corporate governance 
system, institutional investors may then have an incentive to use private information 
obtained by monitoring in order to extract rent from minority shareholders rather than 
to contribute to information dissemination. This implies an increase in information 
asymmetry. Hence, although there may be a signiﬁcant relationship between institutional 
ownership and information asymmetry, its net eﬀect is less clear in emerging markets. 
As mentioned earlier, block shareholders are believed to have private information 
because of their role as a monitor of corporate operations (eg, Bethel et al., 1998). Thus 
ﬁrms with higher block ownership, either by managers or external entities, have larger 
bid-ask spreads for US ﬁrms (Heﬂin and Shaw, 2000). However, a block (controlling) 
shareholder may actually help reduce agency costs, as the monitoring of management 
actions increases with ownership concentration. Furthermore, block shareholders could 
implement a long-term investment perspective which encourages the building of a strong 
contracting link between the ﬁrm and its investors. This could facilitate an improved 
information environment and increased information transparency (Hope et al., 2009), 
and hence reduce information asymmetry. The block shareholders most likely are state 
shareholders, institutional shareholders or foreign shareholders in our research settings.14 
Because the different types of ownership coexist at the same time in a firm, it is 
better to simultaneously investigate their roles in issues related to corporate governance, 
agency cost and information disclosure in order to develop a more comprehensive 
understanding of the role of ownership structure in these issues. Therefore, we also 
control these ownership types to reveal the effects of state ownership together with 
foreign, insider, institutional and block ownership on the information environment.
3. Research Methodology
The bid-ask spread model is ﬁrst estimated using the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
as a function of state ownership plus control variables including volume turnover and 
return volatility in addition to foreign, insider, institutional and block ownership. 
Turnover and volatility are then endogenized by estimating a simultaneous system using 
the three stage least squares (3SLS). We also estimate the model for an adverse selection 
component rather than the total bid-ask spread and perform various robustness checks.
To examine the eﬀect of state ownership, we adopt the following empirical model for 
14 Because the block shareholders most likely are state shareholders, institutional shareholders or foreign 
shareholders in our research settings, we add the block ownership variable as a possible control for the eﬀects of 
other types of shareholders who fall into the controlling position of a ﬁrm. As an alternative measure, we also 
use the residual from a regression of block ownership on state, foreign and institutional ownership to control 
for the same issue and the results remain the same. 
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bid-ask spread:
SPREADit = α0 + α1 STATEit + α2 FOREIGNit + α3 TURNOVERit + α4                           
 VOLATILITYit + α5 SIZEit + α6 BLOCKit + α7 INSIDERit + α8 INSTit  
                         + α       YEAR  + eit        (1)
The model represents our focus on ownership and other variables such as volume 
and volatility that may measure market information environments. The left-hand side 
variable, SPREAD is measured in percentage, by an average weekly bid-ask spread (ask 
minus bid divided by the average of these two prices) of ﬁrm i in year t. 
As an explanatory variable of our primary interest, state ownership (STATE) is 
measured by the percentage of state shares held by government.15 Foreign ownership 
(FOREIGN) is measured by the percentage of shares held by registered foreign 
individual investors.16 Insider ownership (INSIDER) is measured by the percentage of 
shares owned by managers and directors; institutional ownership (INST) is measured by 
the percentage of shares held by domestic securities companies, insurance companies, 
depository institutions, investment companies, endowment funds, and mutual funds;17 
block ownership (BLOCK) is measured by the percentage of shares held by stockholders 
with no less than three percent equity ownership.18    
As other control variables, we include volume turnover rate, which is likely to aﬀect 
bid-ask spread negatively (eg, Copeland and Galai, 1983). We also include a measure of 
volatility because, for an order-driven market, the extent of trading gains by informed 
traders is a positive function of return volatility (Aitken and Frino, 1996). In addition, 
large companies tend to have lower spreads (Greenstein and Sami, 1994), and analyst 
following and media coverage increase with ﬁrm size (Chiang and Venkatesh, 1988). 
Hence, we include ﬁrm size to control for a ﬁrm’s information environment (Leuz and 
Verrecchia, 2000). The indicator variable for year and its interaction terms are included 
15 As an alternative measure, we use the total share percentage owned by state and state controlling enterprises 
(state ownership is no less than 50%) to measure the ownership of government and the results are similar to 
what we reported. In addition, as a sensitivity test, we include both variables (state share percentage and share 
percentage owned by state controlling enterprises in the regression model). The results on the two variables are 
similar to each other as discussed under the Sensitivity Test section.
16 As an alternative measure, we use the total share percentage owned by foreign individuals and institutions to 
measure the ownership of foreign investors and the results are similar to those reported.
17 As an alternative measure, we use the total share percentage owned by domestic and foreign institutions to 
measure the institutional ownership and the results are similar to those reported. Our deﬁnition of institutional 
ownership is standard in empirical corporate ﬁnance. However, Wei et al. (2005) use a broader deﬁnition for 
institutional shareholders, which include domestic state-controlled enterprises as well as ﬁnancial institutions. 
As a robustness test, we also use this alternative deﬁnition of institutional ownership, and the results again are 
similar to those reported.
18 We also experimented with an alternative level of block ownership such as the percentage shares held by 
stockholders with no less than one percent ownership, and the percentage shares held by top ten stockholders, 
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to control for the intertemporal eﬀects of institutional and regulatory changes over time. 
Speciﬁcally, SIZE is a log of average weekly market value of the ﬁrm’s equity during 
the year, and YEAR is an indicator variable for calendar year. TURNOVER is the 
average weekly turnover measured by the value of trading volume divided by market 
value of the equity, in Renminbi, of a ﬁrm for year t, and VOLATILITY is an average of 
the 52-week standard deviations of daily returns of ﬁrm’s stock during year t.
A single-equation specification above assumes an exogeneity of all explanatory 
variables. However, it is plausible that information asymmetry reﬂected in the ownership 
structure can also influence some of these variables, especially volume turnover and 
volatility. To address this concern, we estimate volume turnover and return volatility 
endogenously along with bid-ask spread using the following models:  
TURNOVERit = α0 + α1 SIZEit + α2 VOLATILITYit + α3 INDEXit + α4 STATEit  
     + α5 FOREIGNit + α6 BLOCKit + α7 INSIDERit +α8 INSTit  
     +    YEAR + eit                 (2)
VOLATILITYit = α0 + α1 SIZEit + α2 BETAit + α3 STATEit + α4 FOREIGNit + α5  
        BLOCKit + α6 INSIDERit +α7 INSTit +         YEAR  + eit          (3)
Each of these two models includes ownership variables as explanatory variables. In 
the volume turnover model, we follow Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) and include INDEX, 
which is one if the company’s stock is included in the composite share index on the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange or in the SH180 index on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, and 
zero otherwise. Included in the volatility model is BETA, which is a measure of the ﬁrm’s 
systematic risk and is estimated with weekly returns for the 52-week period.
4. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Our sample selection starts with the entire population of ﬁrms listed on either the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange or the Shenzhen Stock Exchange at the beginning of 1995. 
These ﬁrms are then subject to the following screening criteria: (1) daily last bid and ask 
prices as well as daily closing price data are available for the period of 1995-2000 in the 
Taiwan Economic Journal Database (TEJ); (2) annual corporate reports (with known 
report dates) are available from a Chinese website, www.stock2000.com.cn; and (3) 
information on trading volume and publicly held shares are available from TEJ. 
As shown in Table 1, this screening procedure resulted in a sample of 271 ﬁrms under 
the ﬁxed-ﬁrm approach, which yields 1,549 ﬁrm-year observations for the analysis of the 
pre-period of institutional reform (1995-2000) and 797 ﬁrm-year observations for the 
post period (2001-2003). As indicated earlier, we analyze the periods 1995-2000 and 
2001-2003 separately as the institutional environment experienced signiﬁcant changes 
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diﬀerences in ﬁrm characteristics. However, to increase the external validity of our results, 
we also conducted our tests using pooled data. As shown in Table 1, using the pooled 
sample approach, the same screening procedure resulted in 3,498 ﬁrm-year observations 
(from 1,002 ﬁrms) for the analysis of the pre-period of institutional reform (1995-2000) 
and 3,442 ﬁrm-year observations (from 1,219 ﬁrms) for the post period (2001-2003). 
Table 1. Sample Selection
Sample Selection Procedure Number of Firms Number of Observations
Fixed-Firm Sample
Firms issuing A-shares whose stock price information is available since 
January 1995 287
Less: Firms whose disclosure dates are not available from the Taiwan 
Economic Journal Database (TEJ) or from their annual reports 10
Less: Firms whose bid or ask prices are not available from the Taiwan 
Economic Journal Database (TEJ) 6
Total ﬁrms available for analysis 271
Firm-year observations for the period of 1995-2000 271 1,549
Firm-year observations for the period of 2001-2003 271 797
Pooled-Firm Sample
Firms issuing A-shares whose stock price information is available for the 
period of 1995-2003 1,261
Less: Firms whose disclosure dates are not available from the Taiwan 
Economic Journal Database (TEJ) or from their annual reports 3
Less: Firms whose bid or ask prices are not available from the Taiwan 
Economic Journal Database (TEJ) 39
Total ﬁrms available for analysis 1,219
Firm-year observations for the period of 1995-2000 1,002 3,498
Firm-year observations for the period of 2001-2003 1,219 3,442
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for variables used in the empirical work. 
In the pre-period of institutional reforms, the mean bid-ask spread across ﬁxed sample 
ﬁrms is 0.272 (median is 0.252), while in the post period the mean is -0.004 (median 
is 0.002).19  The mean value of INDEX is 0.248 in the pre-period and 0.256 in the 
post-period, indicating that about a quarter of companies in the sample are included in 
the Shenzhen composite share price index or in the Shanghai SH180 index. Both the 
mean and median of systematic risk are about one in the two periods, which shows the 
19 To simplify the presentation of our results, we only reported the statistical description and correlation 
coeﬃcients for the ﬁxed-ﬁrm sample here.
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eﬃcacy of our sample in mimicking the market portfolio. The mean insider ownership 
is only 0.3% in the pre-period and 0.2% in the post-period but the maximum reaches 
38.7% and 32.4% in the pre- and post-periods, respectively. Institutional ownership is 
more sizable, with a mean of 22.9% in the pre-period and 26.1% in the post-period. 
In our sample of “privatized” ﬁrms, the average share of government ownership slightly 
decreased from 30.1% in the pre-period to 27% in the post-period, which is comparable 
to those reported elsewhere (eg, Chen et al., 2009a). The average foreign ownership 
slightly increased from 6.8% in the pre-period to 8.5% in the post-period, but for 
the sample of ﬁrms with foreign ownership, the foreign inﬂuence can be substantial, 
with a maximum foreign ownership reaching 66.4% for both periods. The remaining 
shareholders other than these four categories should be largely domestic individual 
investors. However, block ownership with at least 3% ownership has a mean of 52.5% in 
the pre-period and 49.3% in the post-period, which indicates a degree of concentration 
in the Chinese stock markets. 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics
Variables Maximum Quartile 3 Median Mean Quartile 1 Minimum
Panel A: Pre-period of Institutional Reforms
SPREAD 0.914 0.335 0.252 0.272 0.190 0.075
VOLATILITY 9.909 3.155 2.712 2.743 2.261 1.196
TURNOVER 16.285 2.728 1.895 2.270 1.222 0.173
SIZE 10.351 8.031 7.470 7.506 6.923 5.442
INDEX 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.248 0.000 0.000
BETA 2.213 1.204 1.052 1.014 0.898 0.066
INSIDER 0.387 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000
STATE 0.886 0.506 0.322 0.301 0.000 0.000
INST 0.907 0.39 0.162 0.229 0.009 0.000
FOREIGN 0.664 0.000 0.000 0.068 0.000 0.000
BLOCK 0.861 0.640 0.524 0.525 0.416 0.000
Panel B: Post-period of Institutional Reforms
SPREAD 0.224 0.043 0.002 -0.004 -0.040 -0.264
VOLATILITY 4.480 2.140 1.890 1.907 1.650 0.700
TURNOVER 7.722 1.216 0.811 0.983 0.583 0.163
SIZE 17.087 15.294 14.825 14.895 14.414 13.317
INDEX 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.256 0.000 0.000
BETA 1.713 1.229 1.075 0.931 0.796 -0.299
INSIDER 0.324 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000
STATE 0.886 0.452 0.297 0.270 0.000 0.000
INST 0.864 0.433 0.207 0.261 0.062 0.000
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Variables Maximum Quartile 3 Median Mean Quartile 1 Minimum
FOREIGN 0.664 0.146 0.000 0.085 0.000 0.000
BLOCK 0.886 0.589 0.493 0.493 0.393 0.032
Note: SPREAD = average weekly bid-ask spread in percentage during the year; SIZE = log of average weekly market value of 
the ﬁrm’s equity during the year; TURNOVER = average weekly share turnover during the year where share turnover is 
deﬁned as the dollar amount of trading volume divided by the market value of the equity of the ﬁrm; VOLATILITY = 
average of 52-week standard deviation of daily returns during the year; INDEX = 1 if the company’s stock is included 
in the composite share index on Shenzhen Stock Exchange or in the SH180 index on Shanghai Stock Exchange 
(and 0 otherwise); BETA = systematic market risk of the ﬁrm, estimated from weekly return for the 52-week period; 
INSIDER = the percentage of common equity shares held by managers and directors; STATE = the percentage of state 
shares; INST = the percentage of common equity shares held by domestic institutions, such as securities companies, 
insurance companies, depository institutions, investment companies, endowment funds, and mutual funds; FOREIGN 
= the percentage of common equity shares held by registered foreign individuals; BLOCK = the percentage of common 
equity shares held by stockholders with no less than 3% ownership according to the annual report. Data is for the ﬁxed-
ﬁrm sample. 
 
Prior to estimating the regression equation, we computed the Pearson correlation 
coeﬃcients among explanatory variables included in equation (1) for the two periods. 
Somewhat surprisingly, there is little correlation (0.023 in the pre-period and 0.005 
in the post-period) between institutional ownership and block ownership (Table 3). 
Similarly, there is little correlation between insider ownership and any of the other 
ownership variables except that between insider and block ownership in the post-period 
(0.14). However, state ownership and institutional ownership have a high negative 
correlation   (-0.747 in the pre-period and -0.767 in the post-period), indicating that the 
majority of privatization cases may involve a sale of SOE shares to institutional investors. 
However, we compute variance inﬂation factors (VIF) for all equations, and the results 
suggest that multicollinearity is not a serious problem, as none of the VIF values is 
greater than the suggested benchmark of 10 (Gujarati, 1995, p339). In addition, volume 
turnover and volatility have a relatively high correlation (0.719 in the pre-period and 
0.674 in the post-period). Hence, as sensitivity tests, we also included these variables 
separately in the estimation, with no appreciable diﬀerences from those obtained when 
both variables are included. Later, the relation between turnover and volatility is further 
directly estimated using the 3SLS. Again, tests of multicollinearity for all explanatory 
variables in the bid-ask spread equation using the methods by Belsley et al. (1980) and 
Gujarati (1995) indicate no serious multicollinearity problem. 
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5. Basic Empirical Results
5.1. Pre-period of Institutional Reforms
Table 4 reports the OLS results of equation (1) using the fixed-firm sample. The 
result shows a positive and signiﬁcant relationship between state ownership and bid-ask 
spread. This conﬁrms Hypothesis 1, indicating that ﬁrms with a higher state ownership 
have a higher information asymmetry as reﬂected in bid-ask spread. This is consistent 
with earlier findings that firms with higher state ownership tend to have a greater 
deviation between cash ﬂow rights and control rights (eg, Wei et al., 2005). When state 
ownership is high, political inﬂuence and ineﬀective management monitoring can play 
a greater role in increasing costs associated with agency and information problems. Our 
ﬁndings are consistent with the notion that the government, as a partial owner of the 
ﬁrm, tends to engage in selective and unscrupulous policies pertaining to information 
conveyance which increases information asymmetry rather than enhancing general 
information environments for all. Therefore, in the emerging market settings, and 
without proper regulations and corporate governance structure, ﬁrms with higher state 
ownership will be associated with a higher level of information asymmetry. 
Table 4. Pre-period of Institutional Reforms: OLS Analysis of State Ownership and 
Bid-Ask Spread
Variables Coeﬃcient T-statistics Two-tail p-value
Intercept 0.684 *** 28.51 <.0001
STATE 0.140 *** 8.84 <.0001
FOREIGN 0.126 *** 8.46 <.0001
INSIDER -0.020 -0.21 0.8310
INST 0.132 *** 7.97 <.0001
BLOCK 0.013 0.83 0.4087
VOLATILITY 0.007 1.23 0.2187
TURNOVER -0.016 *** -7.73 <.0001
SIZE -0.055 *** -19.46 <.0001
YEAR1 -0.009 -1.04 0.2973
YEAR2 -0.081 *** -10.79 <.0001
YEAR3 -0.112 *** -15.76 <.0001
YEAR4 -0.074 *** -9.13 <.0001
YEAR5 -0.120 *** -13.93 <.0001
Adjusted  R2 56.35%
F-value 154.73
*** signiﬁcant at 0.01, ** signiﬁcant at 0.05, * signiﬁcant at 0.10, respectively (two-tail test).
Note: Estimation is done by the OLS based on pooled time series and cross sectional data for 271 publicly traded Chinese 
ﬁrms (1,549 ﬁrm-year observations) for the period of 1995-2000. A speciﬁc form of ownership is used in regression. 
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SPREAD = average weekly bid-ask spread in percentage during the year; SIZE = log of average weekly market value of 
the ﬁrm’s equity during the year; TURNOVER = average weekly share turnover during the year where share turnover is 
deﬁned as the dollar amount of trading volume divided by the market value of the equity of the ﬁrm; VOLATILITY = 
average of 52-week standard deviation of daily returns during the year; INDEX = 1 if the company’s stock is included 
in the composite share index on Shenzhen Stock Exchange or in the SH180 index on Shanghai Stock Exchange (and 0 
otherwise); BETA = systematic market risk of the ﬁrm, estimated from weekly return for the 52-week period; INSIDER 
= the percentage of common equity shares held by managers and directors; STATE = the percentage of state shares; 
INST = the percentage of common equity shares held by domestic institutions, such as securities companies, insurance 
companies, depository institutions, investment companies, endowment funds, and mutual funds; FOREIGN = the 
percentage of common equity shares held by registered foreign individuals; BLOCK = the percentage of common equity 
shares held by stockholders with no less than 3% ownership according to the annual report. Data period is from 1995 
to 2000 and the sample is a ﬁxed-ﬁrm sample.
 Regarding other ownership variables, the coefficient of foreign ownership is 
significant and positive which is consistent with a part of our previous discussion 
regarding the effect of foreign ownership on bid-ask spread. We find no significant 
relationship between insider ownership and bid-ask spread. The weak result on insider 
ownership is consistent with the result of Kini and Mian (1995) for the US firms. 
Similarly, the coeﬃcient of block ownership is statistically insigniﬁcant. Similar results 
are obtained with alternative measures of block ownership, such as the percentage of 
shares owned by stockholders with 1% or more equity ownership, and the percentage of 
shares owned by top ten stockholders. However, the eﬀect of institutional ownership is 
highly signiﬁcant and positive. This is suggestive of a breakdown in corporate governance 
systems in the emerging markets of China. Institutional investors have incentives to use 
private information obtained by monitoring to extract rent from minority shareholders 
rather than to contribute to information dissemination. 
There is evidence that the bid-ask spread has narrowed over time due to an 
improvement in the general information environment, as indicated by the negative 
and signiﬁcant coeﬃcients of YEAR variables after year one (1995). In addition, the 
F tests for the joint effects of ownership and interaction terms involving ownership 
and time (not reported) show that the net intertemporal effect of state ownership is 
positive and signiﬁcant. That is, even considering the intertemporal changes over time, 
state ownership is shown to raise the bid-ask spread due to information asymmetry. To 
the extent that the information consequence of state ownership is more selective than 
general, it presents a challenge for Chinese policymakers in terms of their privatization 
and market liberalization as to how a general information environment can be improved 
rather than for the selected few.
As expected, volume turnover has a signiﬁcant and negative eﬀect on bid-ask spread. 
Return volatility has a positive coefficient as expected, although it is not statistically 
significant. As expected, firm size is shown to lower the bid-ask spread. Additional 
analysis including interaction terms with a time-trend variable indicates that the eﬀect of 
turnover on bid-ask spread has increased over time while that of volatility has decreased.
Table 5 reports the results of 3SLS for the ﬁxed-ﬁrm sample where volume turnover 
and volatility, along with bid-ask spread, are endogenously estimated. The result in Panel 
A for bid-ask spread conﬁrms the result from the single-equation estimation in Table 4. 
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Again, the eﬀect of state ownership is signiﬁcant and positive. In addition, the eﬀects of 
foreign and institutional ownership on bid-ask spread are signiﬁcant and positive, while 
insider and block ownership are statistically insigniﬁcant. One diﬀerence from Table 4 is 
that the coeﬃcient of volume turnover is statistically insigniﬁcant. These results remain 
the same when we perform additional analysis including interaction terms between 
ownership variables and a time-trend variable.
Table 5. Pre-period of Institutional Reforms: 3SLS Analysis of State Ownership and 
Bid-Ask Spread
Variables Coeﬃcient T-statistics Two-tail p-value
System Weighted R2 58.59%
Panel A: Bid-Ask Model
Intercept 0.422 ** 2.22 0.0263
STATE 0.116 *** 4.61 <.0001
FOREIGN 0.104 *** 4.50 <.0001
INSIDER -0.018 -0.17 0.8646
INST 0.129 *** 6.66 <.0001
BLOCK -0.031 -0.89 0.3711
VOLATILITY 0.007 0.54 0.5871
TURNOVER 0.062 1.18 0.2370
SIZE -0.026 -1.28 0.1998
YEAR1 -0.288 -1.50 0.1327
YEAR2 -0.173 *** -2.66 0.0078
YEAR3 -0.167 *** -4.38 <.0001
YEAR4 -0.177 ** -2.45 0.0144
YEAR5 -0.201 *** -3.65 0.0003
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Variables Coeﬃcient T-statistics Two-tail p-value
System Weighted R2 58.59%
Panel B: Volume Turnover Model
Intercept 3.619 *** 5.77 <.0001
STATE 0.330 1.31 0.1919
FOREIGN 0.295 1.24 0.2157
INSIDER 0.022 0.02 0.9880
INST 0.050 0.19 0.8501
BLOCK 0.583 ** 2.40 0.0165
VOLATILITY -0.074 -0.45 0.6559
SIZE -0.390 *** -7.28 <.0001
INDEX 0.014 0.23 0.8151
YEAR1 3.652 *** 16.77 <.0001
YEAR2 1.240 *** 7.89 <.0001
YEAR3 0.712 *** 6.32 <.0001
YEAR4 1.378 *** 8.87 <.0001
YEAR5 1.027 *** 7.42 <.0001
System Weighted R2 58.59%
Panel C: Return Volatility Model
Intercept 3.532 *** 34.59 <.0001
STATE 0.149 * 1.73 0.0838
FOREIGN -0.027 -0.34 0.7338
INSIDER 0.471 0.94 0.3456
INST 0.122 1.36 0.1731
BLOCK 0.221 *** 2.69 0.0071
SIZE -0.166 *** -11.13 <.0001
BETA -0.120 *** -17.57 <.0001
YEAR1 1.153 *** 31.70 <.0001
YEAR2 0.703 *** 18.83 <.0001
YEAR3 0.088 ** 2.33 0.0199
YEAR4 0.598 *** 14.53 <.0001
YEAR5 -0.214 *** -4.85 <.0001
System Weighted R2 58.59%
*** signiﬁcant at 0.01, ** signiﬁcant at 0.05, * signiﬁcant at 0.10, respectively (two-tail test).
Note: Estimation is done by 3SLS based on a ﬁxed-ﬁrm sample of 271 publicly traded Chinese ﬁrms (1,549 ﬁrm-year 
observations) for the period of 1995-2000. See Table 2 for deﬁnitions of variables. 
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Panels B and C explore the impacts of ownership structure on turnover and volatility. 
In Panel B, state ownership has a marginally signiﬁcant coeﬃcient under one-tail test 
(p=0.0959). Foreign ownership has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on volume turnover although 
the coeﬃcient is positive. In Panel C, state ownership again is shown to increase price 
volatility. Foreign ownership has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on price volatility although the 
coeﬃcient is negative. Thus, we did not ﬁnd any evidence on the popular sentiment 
about a potentially destabilizing inﬂuence of foreign investors.20 As to other ownership 
variables, although no eﬀects of block ownership on bid-ask spreads are found, block 
investors are shown to increase turnover and volatility. Insider and institutional 
ownership have no signiﬁcant eﬀect on volume turnover or price volatility. 
5.2. Post-period of Institutional Reforms
Table 6 reports the OLS results of equation (1) for the post-period of institutional 
reforms. The result shows no signiﬁcant relationship between state ownership and bid-
ask spread. This confirms our conjecture, indicating that the changes regarding the 
recent regulations of state ownership and market microstructure, legal litigation risks, 
and corporate governance mechanisms improved the information environment. In 
particular, the changes in these institutional features could deter political inﬂuence, and 
hold constant or reduce agency costs, and reduce information problems associated with 
high state ownership that work to increase information asymmetry. This is consistent 
with earlier evidence suggesting that the institutional environment signiﬁcantly changed 
around 2001. For instance, Chen et al. (2010) ﬁnd that the frequency of modiﬁed audit 
opinions is negatively related to client importance from 1995 to 2000 but positively 
related from 2001 to 2004. Our ﬁndings are consistent with their ﬁndings in suggesting 
that the signiﬁcant changes in institutional environment could signiﬁcantly aﬀect the 
relationship between state ownership and bid-ask spread, as changes in ownership 
regulations regarding state shares and market microstructure, legal litigation risks and 
corporate governance mechanisms would deter the state shareholder from engaging in 
selective and unscrupulous policies pertaining to information conveyance. Similarly, the 
coeﬃcients of other ownership variables are statistically insigniﬁcant. 
20 This is consistent with the ﬁnding by Choe et al. (1999) who report no evidence that foreign investors had a 
destabilizing eﬀect in the Korean stock markets during the Asian ﬁnancial crisis.
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Table 6. Post-period of Institutional Reforms: OLS Analysis of State Ownership and 
Bid-Ask Spread
Variables Coeﬃcient T-statistics Two-tail p-value
Intercept 0.049 0.85 0.3929
STATE -0.001 -0.05 0.9605
INST -0.007 -0.34 0.7371
FOREIGN 0.016 0.96 0.3359
BLOCK 0.012 0.59 0.5585
INSIDER -0.002 -0.02 0.9867
VOLATILITY 0.007 0.90 0.3709
TURNOVER -0.003 -0.62 0.5341
SIZE -0.005 -1.45 0.1476
YEAR7 0.006 1.19 0.2333
YEAR8 0.011 2.12 0.0347
Adjusted  R2 3.05%
F-value 1.23
*** signiﬁcant at 0.01, ** signiﬁcant at 0.05, * signiﬁcant at 0.10, respectively (two-tail test).
Note: Data period is from 2001-2003 and the sample is a ﬁxed-ﬁrm sample. See Table 2 for the deﬁnitions of variables.
 
There is evidence that the bid-ask spread has stopped the narrowing pattern during 
the period subsequent to the institutional reforms. As expected, volume turnover and 
ﬁrm size have negative eﬀects on bid-ask spread, while return volatility has a positive 
coeﬃcient as expected, although they are not statistically signiﬁcant. 
Table 7 reports the results of 3SLS where volume turnover and volatility, along with 
bid-ask spread, are endogenously estimated. The result in Panel A for bid-ask spread 
conﬁrms the result from the single-equation estimation in Table 6. Again, the eﬀect of 
state ownership is not signiﬁcant. 
Table 7. Post-period of Institutional Reforms: 3SLS Analysis of State Ownership and 
Bid-Ask Spread
Variables Coeﬃcient T-statistics Two-tail p-value
Panel A: Bid-Ask Model
Intercept 0.040 0.40 0.6907
STATE 0.022 0.63 0.5309
INST 0.015 0.45 0.6539
FOREIGN 0.053 1.11 0.2684
BLOCK 0.009 0.41 0.6801
INSIDER 0.023 0.21 0.8370
VOLATILITY 0.034 0.81 0.4174
TURNOVER -0.039 -0.86 0.3881
SIZE -0.006 -1.30 0.1945
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Variables Coeﬃcient T-statistics Two-tail p-value
YEAR7 -0.002 -0.15 0.88
YEAR8 0.011 1.70 0.0898
System Weighted R2 16.36%
Panel B: Volume Turnover Model
Intercept -1.717 ** -2.22 0.0265
STATE 0.498 *** 2.90 0.0039
INST 0.472 *** 2.83 0.0048
FOREIGN 0.857 *** 5.91 <.0001
BLOCK -0.102 -0.61 0.5408
INSIDER 0.595 0.72 0.4712
VOLATILITY 0.914 *** 7.22 <.0001
SIZE 0.052 1.24 0.2141
INDEX -0.138 *** -3.11 0.0019
YEAR7 -0.226 *** -5.49 <.0001
YEAR8 0.038 0.79 0.4287
System Weighted R2 16.36%
Panel C: Return Volatility Model
Intercept 4.411 *** 15.27 <.0001
STATE 0.289 ** 2.41 0.0163
INST 0.316 *** 2.71 0.0070
FOREIGN 0.466 *** 5.05 <.0001
BLOCK 0.011 0.09 0.9275
INSIDER 0.268 0.44 0.6606
SIZE -0.194 *** -10.11 <.0001
BETA 0.323 *** 10.74 <.0001
YEAR7 -0.068 ** -2.08 0.0379
YEAR8 -0.308 *** -9.66 <.0001
System Weighted R2 16.36%
*** signiﬁcant at 0.01, ** signiﬁcant at 0.05, * signiﬁcant at 0.10, respectively (two-tail test).
Note: Estimation is done by 3SLS based on a ﬁxed-ﬁrm sample of 271 publicly traded Chinese ﬁrms for the period of 2001-
2003. See Table 2 for deﬁnitions of variables. 
5.3. A Pooled Sample in the Pre-period of Institutional Reforms
In the previous tests, we used a ﬁxed-ﬁrm sample design to investigate the eﬀect of 
state ownership on bid-ask spread. To check whether the results are sensitive to using a 
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pooled sample for all publicly traded ﬁrms during the pre-period of institutional reforms, 
we re-estimated Tables 4 and 5 and the results are reported in Tables 8 and 9.21 The OLS 
results, regarding state ownership, in Table 8 are similar to those reported in Table 4. 
The 3SLS analyses in Table 9 indicate the signiﬁcant eﬀect of state ownership on bid-ask 
spread reported in Table 5 is unchanged after using an expanded (pooled) sample.
Table 8. Pre-period of Institutional Reforms: OLS Analysis on State Ownership and 
Bid-ask Spread with a Pooled Sample
Variables Coeﬃcient T-statistics Two-tail p-value
Intercept 0.548 *** 32.59 <.0001
STATE 0.048 *** 4.27 <.0001
INST 0.067 *** 5.58 <.0001
FOREIGN 0.137 *** 9.97 <.0001
BLOCK 0.029 *** 3.59 0.0003
INSIDER -0.069 *** -2.71 0.0069
VOLATILITY 0.001 ** 2.01 0.0447
TURNOVER -0.006 *** -8.29 <.0001
SIZE -0.050 *** -23.88 <.0001
YEAR1 0.126 *** 19.90 <.0001
YEAR2 0.123 *** 22.06 <.0001
YEAR3 0.034 *** 7.41 <.0001
YEAR4 0.012 *** 2.86 0.0042
YEAR5 0.038 *** 8.05 <.0001
Adjusted R2 46.50%
F-value 234.85
*** signiﬁcant at 0.01, ** signiﬁcant at 0.05, * signiﬁcant at 0.10, respectively (two-tail test).
Note: Estimation is done by the OLS based on pooled time series and cross sectional data for 1,002 publicly traded Chinese 
ﬁrms (3,498 ﬁrm-year observations) for the period of 1995-2000. See Table 2 for deﬁnitions of variables. 
Table 9. Pre-period of Institutional Reforms: 3SLS Analysis of State Ownership and 
Bid-Ask Spread with a Pooled Sample
Variables Coeﬃcient T-statistics Two-tail p-value
Panel A: Bid-Ask Model
Intercept 0.524 *** 13.46 <.0001
STATE 0.045 ** 2.30 0.0216
INST 0.062 *** 3.34 0.0009
FOREIGN 0.136 *** 7.38 <.0001
21 The results remain the same when IPO observations are excluded.
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Variables Coeﬃcient T-statistics Two-tail p-value
BLOCK 0.034 *** 2.81 0.0049
INSIDER -0.106 ** -2.30 0.0217
VOLATILITY 0.019 1.55 0.1213
TURNOVER -0.016 -1.13 0.2599
SIZE -0.051 *** -10.97 <.0001
YEAR1 0.123 *** 9.06 <.0001
YEAR2 0.143 *** 4.44 <.0001
YEAR3 0.040 *** 5.28 <.0001
YEAR4 0.019 ** 2.38 0.0172
YEAR5 0.041 *** 4.83 <.0001
System Weighted R2 20.69%
Panel B: Volume Turnover Model
Intercept 1.612 ** 2.45 0.0145
STATE 0.805 ** 2.48 0.0133
INST 0.622 * 1.83 0.0668
FOREIGN -0.588 -1.64 0.1003
BLOCK 0.394 * 1.88 0.0607
INSIDER -2.515 *** -3.71 0.0002
VOLATILITY 0.622 *** 4.38 <.0001
TURNOVER -0.217 *** -3.67 0.0002
SIZE -0.433 *** -3.52 0.0004
YEAR1 -0.653 *** -3.76 0.0002
YEAR2 2.435 *** 16.25 <.0001
YEAR3 0.379 *** 3.05 0.0023
YEAR4 -0.227 -1.46 0.1453
YEAR5 -0.373 *** -2.59 0.0098
System Weighted R2 20.69%
Panel C: Return Volatility Model
Intercept 3.854 *** 5.61 <.0001
STATE 1.099 ** 2.37 0.0179
INST 1.039 ** 2.11 0.0353
FOREIGN -0.344 -0.61 0.5427
BLOCK 0.011 0.03 0.9749
INSIDER 1.427 1.37 0.1713
SIZE -0.156 * -1.81 0.0704
BETA -0.116 *** -4.41 <.0001
YEAR1 -0.372 -1.43 0.1527
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Variables Coeﬃcient T-statistics Two-tail p-value
YEAR2 0.265 1.20 0.23
YEAR3 -0.273 -1.45 0.1472
YEAR4 -0.771 *** -4.35 <.0001
YEAR5 -0.558 *** -2.87 0.0042
System Weighted R2 20.69%
*** signiﬁcant at 0.01, ** signiﬁcant at 0.05, * signiﬁcant at 0.10, respectively (two-tail test).
Note: Estimation is done by 3SLS based on pooled time series and cross sectional data for 1,002 publicly traded Chinese ﬁrms 
(3,498 ﬁrm-year observations) for the period of 1995-2000. See Table 2 for deﬁnitions of variables. 
5.4. A Pooled Sample in the Post-period of Institutional Reforms
Similarly, to check whether the results on the post-period of institutional reforms are 
sensitive to using a pooled sample for all publicly traded ﬁrms, we re-estimated Tables 
6 and 7 for the pooled sample and the results of OLS and 3SLS are reported in Tables 
10 and 11, respectively. As shown in these tables, we did not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant results 
on the eﬀect of state ownership on bid-ask spread. This, in turn, indicates that due to 
changes in ownership regulations regarding state shares and market microstructure, legal 
litigation risks and corporate governance mechanisms, the undesirable effect of state 
ownership on information asymmetry disappeared. It also indicates that due care should 
be exercised when we generalize the results from emerging markets to other periods or to 
other markets because of the transitional nature of such markets.
Table 10. Post-Period of Institutional Reforms: OLS Analysis of State Ownership and 
Bid-Ask Spread with a Pooled Sample
Variables Coeﬃcient T-statistics Two-tail p-value
Intercept 10.079 *** 3.57 0.0004
STATE 1.361 0.87 0.3835
INST 0.229 0.15 0.8818
FOREIGN 2.945 ** 2.21 0.0272
BLOCK -0.967 -0.73 0.4639
INSIDER 0.284 0.06 0.9507
VOLATILITY -0.297 *** -3.69 0.0020
TURNOVER 0.149 1.42 0.1558
SIZE -0.738 *** -3.85 <.0001
YEAR7 0.842 *** 2.83 0.0005
YEAR8 0.632 ** 2.08 0.0374
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Variables Coeﬃcient T-statistics Two-tail p-value
Adjusted R2 1.30%
F-value  5.52 ***
*** signiﬁcant at 0.01, ** signiﬁcant at 0.05, * signiﬁcant at 0.10, respectively (two-tail test).
Note: Estimation is done by OLS based on pooled time series and cross sectional data for 1,219 publicly traded Chinese ﬁrms 
(3,442 ﬁrm-year observations) for the period of 2001-2003. See Table 2 for deﬁnitions of variables. 
Table 11. Post-period of Institutional Reforms: 3SLS Analysis of State Ownership and 
Bid-Ask Spread with a Pooled Sample
Variables Coeﬃcient T-statistics Two-tail p-value
Panel A: Bid-Ask Model
Intercept -930.844 -0.55 0.5858
STATE -141.046 -0.59 0.5574
INST -110.617 -0.60 0.5479
FOREIGN -204.742 -0.58 0.5651
BLOCK -116.613 -0.57 0.5697
INSIDER -245.304 -0.61 0.5423
VOLATILITY 68.587 0.48 0.6280
TURNOVER 124.578 0.62 0.5341
SIZE 52.406 0.55 0.5820
YEAR7 40.234 0.58 0.5615
YEAR8 48.502 0.53 0.5959
System Weighted R2 1.51%
Panel B: Volume Turnover Model
Intercept 7.316 1.13 0.2581
STATE 1.104 1.48 0.1382
INST 0.853 1.28 0.2012
FOREIGN 1.639 * 1.82 0.0693
BLOCK 0.891 1.08 0.2784
INSIDER 1.937 1.00 0.3176
VOLATILITY -0.537 -0.56 0.5739
SIZE -0.409 -1.23 0.2172
INDEX -0.115 -0.99 0.3230
YEAR7 -0.311 -1.37 0.1709
YEAR8 -0.373 -0.78 0.4337
System Weighted R2 1.51%
Panel C: Return Volatility Model
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Variables Coeﬃcient T-statistics Two-tail p-value
Intercept 6.399 *** 6.73 <.0001
STATE 0.323 0.62 0.5380
INST 0.121 0.23 0.8159
FOREIGN 0.698 1.56 0.1191
BLOCK 0.612 1.38 0.1678
INSIDER -0.109 -0.07 0.9435
SIZE -0.322 *** -5.01 <.0001
BETA 0.133 1.34 0.1791
YEAR7 -0.026 ** -2.36 0.0183
YEAR8 -0.531 *** -4.86 <.0001
System Weighted R2 1.51%
*** signiﬁcant at 0.01, ** signiﬁcant at 0.05, * signiﬁcant at 0.10, respectively (two-tail test).
Note: Estimation is done by 3SLS based on pooled time series and cross sectional data for 1,219 publicly traded Chinese ﬁrms 
(3,442 ﬁrm-year observations) for the period of 2001-2003. See Table 2 for deﬁnitions of variables. 
 
6. Further Examinations
6.1. The Adverse Selection Component of Bid-Ask Spread
In the empirical work above, we used the total bid-ask spread as a measure of 
information asymmetry as influenced by specific corporate ownership variables. 
However, one can argue that total spread includes several components (order processing, 
inventory holding, and adverse selection), of which only the adverse selection component 
measures information asymmetry. To check for the sensitivity of our results, we have 
estimated the adverse selection component of bid-ask spread based on the method used 
by George, Kaul and Nimalendran (1991). The correlation between the total spread and 
the adverse selection component is 0.86. 
Based on the above discussions, equation (1) is re-estimated using the adverse 
selection component as the dependent variable, by OLS for single equation estimation 
and also as a simultaneous system along with equations (2) and (3) by 3SLS. The results, 
presented in Table 12, are not materially diﬀerent from those from the basic estimation 
results above using the total spread (only the results for the pre-period are reported to 
simplify the presentation). In both OLS and 3SLS, results are comparable. Hence, the 
use of the adverse selection component rather than the total spread does not materially 
alter any of the conclusions arrived at earlier in the paper.
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Table 12. The Effect of State Ownership on the Adverse Selection Component of the Bid-Ask 
Spread Prior to Institutional Reforms 
Variables Coeﬃcient T-statistics Two-tail p-value
Panel A: OLS Analysis
Intercept 0.456 *** 40.91 <.0001
STATE 0.065 *** 8.85 <.0001
FOREIGN 0.043 *** 6.22 <.0001
INSIDER -0.055 -1.30 0.1952
INST 0.064 *** 8.36 <.0001
BLOCK -0.003 -0.48 0.6303
VOLATILITY 0.001 0.21 0.8313
TURNOVER -0.006 *** -6.57 <.0001
SIZE -0.045 *** -34.34 <.0001
YEAR1 -0.010 ** -2.39 0.0168
YEAR2 -0.040 *** -11.35 <.0001
YEAR3 -0.060 *** -18.03 <.0001
YEAR4 -0.043 *** -11.55 <.0001
YEAR5 -0.053 *** -13.12 <.0001
Adjusted R2 72.30%
F-value 281.91 ***
Panel B: 3SLS Analysis
Intercept 0.568 *** 6.67 <.0001
STATE 0.075 *** 6.72 <.0001
FOREIGN 0.052 *** 5.04 <.0001
INSIDER -0.055 -1.15 0.2515
INST 0.066 *** 7.62 <.0001
BLOCK 0.015 0.92 0.3556
VOLATILE -0.002 -0.42 0.6755
TURNOVER -0.037 -1.56 0.1193
SIZE -0.057 *** -6.26 <.0001
YEAR1 0.103 1.19 0.2323
YEAR2 -0.001 -0.04 0.9671
YEAR3 -0.038 ** -2.21 0.0273
YEAR4 -0.001 -0.02 0.9822
YEAR5 -0.021 -0.86 0.3880
System Weighted R2 58.35%
*** signiﬁcant at 0.01, ** signiﬁcant at 0.05, * signiﬁcant at 0.10, respectively (two-tail test).
Note: Estimation is done on pooled time series and cross sectional data for 271 publicly traded Chinese ﬁrms (1,549 ﬁrm-year 
observations) for the period of 1995-2000. A speciﬁc form of ownership is used in regression. See Table 2 for deﬁnitions 
of variables. 
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 6.2. More Control Variables on Ownership 
In the primary test, we used state share percentage to measure state ownership. 
However, state controlling enterprises in which state ownership is no less than 50%, 
are also allowed to own shares issued by public companies. To investigate whether the 
two types of ownership have different effects on information asymmetry, we include 
both STATE (measured by the percentage of state shares in total shares) and SCINSTI 
(measured by the ownership of state controlled enterprises, in which state ownership 
is no less than 50%) in the regression model. Also, we include foreign institution 
ownership (FOREIGNINST) and foreign individual ownership (FOREIGN) to shed 
light on the potential diﬀerence on the eﬀects on information environment between the 
two diﬀerent foreign ownerships. The results, presented in Tables 13 and 14, are not 
materially diﬀerent from those from the basic estimation results for the pre-period of 
institutional reforms reported in Tables 4 and 5. Both OLS and 3SLS results show that 
the magnitude of both state ownership and ownership by state controlled enterprises 
has an increasing eﬀect on information asymmetry for the pre-period. Again, we only 
present the results for the pre-period to simplify the presentation. The results for the 
post-period are quite similar to those reported in Tables 6 and 7.
Table 13. The Eﬀects of Ownership by State and State Controlling Enterprises on Bid-ask Spread 
Prior to Institutional Reforms
Variables Coeﬃcient T-statistics Two-tail p-value
Intercept 0.684 *** 28.71 <.0001
STATE 0.145 *** 8.46 <.0001
SCINSTI 0.135 *** 7.86 <.0001
FOREIGNINST 0.028 0.73 0.4628
FOREIGN 0.127 *** 8.49 <.0001
INSIDER -0.018 -0.20 0.8428
BLOCK 0.008 0.51 0.6091
VOLATILITY 0.006 1.21 0.2258
TURNOVER -0.016 *** -7.72 <.0001
SIZE -0.055 *** -19.46 <.0001
YEAR1 -0.009 -1.02 0.3081
YEAR2 -0.081 *** -10.73 <.0001
YEAR3 -0.112 *** -15.69 <.0001
YEAR4 -0.073 *** -9.11 <.0001
YEAR5 -0.119 *** -13.90 <.0001
Adjusted  R2 56.34%
F-value 143.67 ***
*** signiﬁcant at 0.01, ** signiﬁcant at 0.05, * signiﬁcant at 0.10, respectively (two-tail test).
Note: Estimation is done by the OLS based on for a ﬁxed-ﬁrm sample of 271 publicly traded Chinese ﬁrms (1,549 ﬁrm-year 
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observations) for the period of 1995-2000. SPREAD = average weekly bid-ask spread in percentage during the year; 
SIZE = log of average weekly market value of the ﬁrm’s equity during the year; TURNOVER = average weekly share 
turnover during the year where share turnover is deﬁned as the dollar amount of trading volume divided by the market 
value of the equity of the ﬁrm; VOLATILITY = average of 52-week standard deviation of daily returns during the 
year; INDEX = 1 if the company’s stock is included in the composite share index on Shenzhen Stock Exchange or in the 
SH180 index on Shanghai Stock Exchange (and 0 otherwise); BETA = systematic market risk of the ﬁrm, estimated 
from weekly return for the 52-week period; INSIDER = the percentage of common equity shares held by managers and 
directors; STATE = the percentage of state shares; SCINSTI = the percentage of common equity shares held by state 
controlling enterprises, in which state ownership is no less than 50%; FOREIGNINST = the percentage of common 
equity shares held by registered foreign institutions; FOREIGN = the percentage of common equity shares held by 
registered foreign individuals; BLOCK = the percentage of common equity shares held by stockholders with no less than 
3% ownership according to the annual report. Data period is from 1995 to 2000.
 
Table 14. 3SLS Analysis of the Eﬀects of State Ownership and Ownership by State Controlling 
Enterprises on the Bid-Ask Spread Prior to Institutional Reforms
Variables Coeﬃcient T-statistics Two-tail p-value
Intercept 0.438 ** 2.25 0.0243
STATE 0.118 *** 4.17 <.0001
SCINSTI 0.129 *** 6.39 <.0001
FOREIGNINST 0.005 0.11 0.9114
FOREIGN 0.105 *** 4.47 <.0001
BLOCK -0.029 -0.87 0.3831
INSIDER -0.018 -0.17 0.8653
VOLTILITY 0.006 0.52 0.6018
TURNOVER 0.058 1.07 0.2828
SIZE -0.028 -1.33 0.1831
YEAR1 0.272 -1.39 0.1656
YEAR2 -0.168 ** -2.52 0.0120
YEAR3 -0.164 *** -4.18 <.0001
YEAR4 -0.171 ** -2.31 0.0209
YEAR5 -0.196 *** -3.48 0.0005
System Weighted R2 58.53%
*** signiﬁcant at 0.01, ** signiﬁcant at 0.05, * signiﬁcant at 0.10, respectively (two-tail test).
Note: Estimation is done by 3SLS based on a ﬁxed-ﬁrm sample of 271 publicly traded Chinese ﬁrms (1,549 ﬁrm-year 
observations) for the period of 1995-2000. See Table 13 for deﬁnitions of variables. 
6.3. Other Robustness Checks
In our estimation, we included ﬁrms listed on either the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
or the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. To check whether the results are sensitive to listing in 
particular exchanges, we re-estimated Table 4 including a dummy variable for exchange 
listing (and also separately for each of the two samples listed in these exchanges). The 
results are similar to those reported in our paper.
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Another issue concerns audit quality, which may influence the quality of some 
corporate variables used in the bid-ask spread model. Audit quality is usually measured 
by ﬁrm size or by the market share of auditors that may correlate with audit quality 
(eg, Gul et al., 2002). DeFond et al. (2000), in particular, examine the eﬀect of auditor 
independence on audit market concentration in China. Following their speciﬁcation, 
we included an audit dummy variable, which is one if the company is audited by one 
of the ten largest accounting ﬁrms (including the Chinese and Big-Four international 
accounting ﬁrms and their joint ventures) in terms of the total combined assets of client 
firms, and zero otherwise. The results of this estimation, as they relate to ownership 
variables, are qualitatively the same as those reported earlier. 
Since the majority of firms are state controlled or closely held, the results could 
be due to the ownership concentration instead of state ownership. To address this 
concern, we add one control variable for ownership concentration, using the total share 
percentage of the top ten shareholders as a measure. The results are qualitatively the same 
as those reported.
In addition to bid-ask spread, the literature also uses volume turnover and price 
volatility as measures of information asymmetry (eg, Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000). 
The OLS estimation of volume turnover model – equation (2) for the pooled sample 
indicates that state ownership increased with volume turnover and return volatility prior 
to the institutional reforms (not reported in tables). The 3SLS results for the pre-period 
further conﬁrm that after controlling for simultaneous eﬀects of state ownership and 
other factors on volume turnover and return volatility, the state ownership signiﬁcantly 
and positively aﬀected volume turnover and return volatility (See Panels B and C in 
Table 9). In contrast, in the post-period, the OLS and 3SLS estimations of the volume 
turnover model for the pooled sample show that the coeﬃcient for state ownership in the 
volume turnover model is positive but not statistically signiﬁcant at a two-tail test (OLS 
results are not reported; 3SLS results are presented in Panel B of Table 11), whereas the 
same coeﬃcients regarding trading volume and return volatility are insigniﬁcant. These 
results in general are consistent with those of the primary tests suggesting that changes 
in institutional environment have signiﬁcantly aﬀected the role of state ownership in 
the information environment. In particular, the positive link between state ownership 
and price volatility for the pre-period is consistent with earlier studies that ﬁnd return 
volatility tends to increase with information asymmetry. However, diﬀerent from earlier 
studies in developed markets where trading volume tends to decrease with information 
asymmetry, we ﬁnd that without a good institutional environment, share turnover in 
the emerging markets could increase with information asymmetry as informed trading 
became more pervasive. 
Finally, following a suggestion by Leuz and Verrecchia (2000), we also re-estimated 
equation (1) using the average dollar amount of trading volume and share prices, 
respectively, as measures of TURNOVER and SIZE. Alternatively, we also included 
share prices in addition to TURNOVER and SIZE variables. The results of these 
experiments again are qualitatively similar to those already reported in the paper. 
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7. Conclusions and Implications
The market microstructure models suggest that adverse selection due to information 
asymmetry increases bid-ask spread. To the extent that the ownership structure of a ﬁrm 
entails information asymmetry, it should also inﬂuence the bid-ask spread. In this study, 
we examine the eﬀect of corporate ownership on information asymmetry measured by 
bid-ask spread in the emerging markets of China. We ﬁnd that government ownership 
has significant and positive impacts on bid-ask spread during 1995-2000. However, 
when we analyze the data available to us for the subsequent years (2001-2003), we ﬁnd 
that the magnitude of state ownership does not raise the bid-ask spread (information 
asymmetry). 
The ﬁnding that state ownership raised bid-ask spread over 1995-2000 is consistent 
with recent studies on emerging markets including China, which indicate that firms 
with higher state ownership tend to have a greater deviation between cash ﬂow rights 
and control rights (eg, Wei et al., 2005). When state ownership is high, political 
inﬂuence and ineﬀective management monitoring can play a greater role in increasing 
costs associated with agency and information problems. This implies that lower 
state ownership is associated with lower information asymmetry in the market, an 
economic consequence of signiﬁcant economic reform and privatization on the market 
microstructure, and contrasts with some misconceptions that state ownership does not 
aﬀect the bid-ask spread because state shares were not tradable in our sample period. 
However, the lack of a signiﬁcant eﬀect of state ownership on bid-ask spread over the 
period of 2001-2003 indicates that the changes regarding the recent regulations of state 
ownership and market microstructure, legal litigation risks, and corporate governance 
mechanisms improved the information environment. In particular, the changes in 
these institutional features could deter political influence, hold constant or decrease 
agency costs and information problems associated with high state ownership that work 
otherwise to increase information asymmetry.
By examining the connection between ownership and information asymmetry as 
measured by bid-ask spread, we extend the market microstructure literature to corporate 
governance and information transparency. This paper provides direct evidence on the 
relationship between ownership and information asymmetry in emerging markets. 
Beyond that, the study has several important policy implications. Our result that high 
state ownership is associated with high information asymmetry during 1995-2000 but 
which disappears during 2001-2003 suggests that the privatization of state enterprises, 
among other things, can contribute to economic efficiency by reducing the cost of 
information asymmetry and hence, lower the cost of capital. Similarly, policies should be 
devised in such a way that institutional investors including foreigners are encouraged to 
contribute to the enhancement of information transparency rather than acting as another 
agent to increase information asymmetry in order to exploit their speciﬁc informational 
advantages at the expense of other investors.
Finally, our study is based on the information asymmetry theory, which supports 
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the weak or semi-strong version of the eﬃcient market hypothesis but not its strong 
version. The semi-strong version argues that the market prices reflect all publicly 
available information and respond instantly to new information, and the strong version 
argues that market prices reﬂect inside information. Thus our measure of information 
asymmetry does not require a strong assumption of market eﬃciency. However, due to 
the nature of the emerging markets of China, which is known in the literature for its 
ineﬃciency, the generalization potential of our results to other markets or other periods 
of time requires further study. 
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